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ABSTRACT
This article takes the position that any lingering ambiguities
surrounding the militarization and weaponization of outer
space should be analyzed via the joint scope of the Outer Space
Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict. This article pulls key pro-
visions from Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
because of Additional Protocol I’s application in international
conflicts and affirmation of the four Geneva Conventions. After
an examination of key Additional Protocol I provisions and their
application to space, this article conducts a joint analysis of the
Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict. This joint
analysis examines three areas of militarization and weaponiza-
tion in space: military personnel in space, anti-satellite weap-
onry, and national defense in space.
INTRODUCTION
AT ONE POINT IN HISTORY, the militarization of spaceseemed to be little more than a fantasy. When the Soviet
Union’s satellite Sputnik-1 successfully launched into outer space
in 1957, the so-called “fantasy” became reality for many.1 The
space race was officially declared that day: both the United
States and the Soviet Union were striving for advancement in
space. However, that may not have been the only race declared
that day. No longer was military action restricted to the in-
grained models of land, sea, and air. Beginning in 1959, several
proposals were presented which would bar the use of outer
space for military purposes.2 Ultimately, the first treaty to govern
military action in outer space was the Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
1 See Robert David Onley, Death from Above? The Weaponization of Space and the
Threat to International Humanitarian Law, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 739, 741 (2013).
2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF
STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND
OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, https://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm [https://per
ma.cc/979E-SJZ8].
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(the Outer Space Treaty).3 As mankind’s presence and capabili-
ties in space began to magnify, a number of international trea-
ties were drafted and adopted to govern a State’s actions in
outer space and detail any liability deriving from such actions.4
These treaties addressed militarization in space, limited the
types of actions in which military personnel could engage, and
proscribed the use of certain weaponry.
As mankind continues to seek the advancement of our capa-
bilities in space, and as our technology continues to advance,
new questions regarding military activity develop. The treaties
governing outer space activities may have been able to dictate
permissible actions to a point, but it would have been impossible
to foresee the various advancements in military technology and
strategy. However, this is not a failure on the part of the outer
space treaties, because to determine what military action is per-
mitted, it is necessary to read applicable provisions with the Law
of Armed Conflict. The Law of Armed Conflict, namely the Ge-
neva Conventions, applies automatically in most cases and is the
core standard to which everyone is held in a conflict.5 The
Outer Space Treaty is the core standard for activities in space,
and the Law of Armed Conflict builds upon the Treaty’s restric-
tions. For this reason, when examining new and developing
questions surrounding military action in space, it is necessary to
examine the Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict
together.
This article examines the application of the Outer Space
Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict on advancing issues of
space militarization and weaponization. The article focuses on
the scope of these two areas of international law and argues that
the proper manner for examining emerging issues of militariza-
tion and weaponization in space is to utilize applicable articles
of the Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict
jointly. To properly demonstrate the joint application of the
Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict, this note
analyzes their application to (1) the presence of military person-
nel in outer space; (2) the use of anti-satellite weaponry; and (3)
the application to national defense in outer space.
3 See id.
4 See generally Emily Taft, Outer Space: The Final Frontier or the Final Battlefield?, 15
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 362, 365–69 (2017).
5 THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL
374–76 (2009).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. TREATIES GOVERNING OUTER SPACE
The treaties that govern outer space activity consist of the
before-mentioned Outer Space Treaty; the Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Rescue Agreement);
the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects (the Liability Convention); the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the Regis-
tration Convention); and the Agreement Governing the Activi-
ties of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the
Moon Treaty).6
The Outer Space Treaty requires parties to use the Moon and
other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes.7 In general terms, it
prohibits placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction in orbit, on the Moon, or on other celestial
bodies.8 The treaty deters a State’s ability to claim sovereignty
over the Moon or celestial bodies.9 Further, under the treaty,
States are answerable for any damage caused by objects
launched into space from their territory, bear responsibility for
their activities in space, and are required to assist astronauts in
distress.10 In addition, any installations and vehicles in space
shall be open, on a reciprocal basis, to representatives of other
States, and all parties agree to conduct outer-space activities in
accordance with international law.11 This note will primarily fo-
cus on the Outer Space Treaty.
The Rescue Agreement requires “the safe return of astronauts
and objects launched into space to their country of origin” on
the request of the State.12 The Liability Convention establishes
processes for resolving “the liability of a state that damages or
6 See ROBERT RAMEY, SPACE WARFARE AND THE FUTURE LAW OF WAR 86–119
(1999).
7 See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
8 Id. art. IV.
9 Id. art. II.
10 Id. arts. V–VII.
11 Id. art. XII.
12 International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space Weapons, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS (Feb. 11, 2004), http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weap-
ons/international-legal-agreements [https://perma.cc/232E-RUVH].
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destroys space objects of another state[.]”13 The Registration
Convention requires “the registration of objects launched into
space” with the United Nations.14 The Moon Agreement pro-
vides that the Moon and other celestial bodies “should be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes, that their environments
should not be disrupted, and that the United Nations should be
informed of the location and purpose of any station established
on those bodies.”15 Further, the Moon Agreement bans “any
ownership of extraterrestrial property by any organization or
private person, unless that organization is international and gov-
ernmental.”16 The primary issue with the Moon Agreement is
that it is of little practical use since a large majority of States
have not signed onto the agreement.17
B. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The first Geneva Convention, the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
encompasses treatment of wounded soldiers and medical per-
sonnel who are not actively taking part in hostility against a
party.18 The second Geneva Convention, the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, extends the protections within the first
convention to naval forces and shipwrecked soldiers.19 The third
Geneva Convention, the Treatment of Prisoners of War, defines
and dictates the treatment of prisoners of war.20 Finally, the
fourth Geneva Convention, the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, grants civilians protection from inhumane treat-
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Michael Listner, The Moon Treaty: Failed International Law or Waiting in the




18 See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
31.
19 See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
20 See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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ment and attack, an extension of the protections granted to sick
and wounded soldiers in the first convention.21
The Additional Protocols provide greater protections for in-
ternational and non-international armed conflict.22 Protocol I
also expands the protections of civilians and combatants in in-
ternational conflicts.23 In addition, it extends protections to
“medical facilities, cultural objects, places of worship, and re-
sources relied on by the civilian population.”24 Further, Addi-
tional Protocol I bans area bombardment, aerial bombardment
which indiscriminately targets a large area, and requires com-
mand responsibility of superiors for the acts committed by their
service members.25
Common Article III, present within all the Geneva Conven-
tions, details the applicability of the remaining Geneva Conven-
tion articles to armed conflicts not of an international nature.26
Protocol II develops the safeguards of Common Article III appli-
cable to these conflicts.27 Non-international armed conflicts
were believed to consist of civil wars alone, but they have also
come to be associated with terrorism.28
The Law of Armed Conflict contains two notable customary
principles that limit the prosecution of war: jus in bello and jus ad
bellum.29 Jus in bello is the law that regulates “the conduct of
States once armed conflict between them has begun.”30 Jus ad
bellum is the law governing a resort to armed conflict.31 Put more
simply, jus in bello disregards whether a conflict is lawful or un-
lawful, choosing instead to focus on the actions of the States in
the conflict. Jus ad bellum focuses on whether the resort to the
21 See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
22 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
23 See Erin Creegan, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Treatment of Terrorist Combatants (Protocol IV)—A Proposal,
41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 345, 360–66 (2011).
24 See id. at 361.
25 Id. at 360–66.
26 Id. at 364–65.
27 Id. at 365.
28 Id.
29 Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space,
48 A.F. L. REV. 1, 32 (2000).
30 Id.
31 Id.
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use of force is justifiable. This note will primarily focus on Proto-
col I.
II. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
The Law of Armed Conflict and the Outer Space Treaty con-
tain uniform concepts. Due to the nature of their use, it may
appear that the Law of Armed Conflict dictates actions on land
and the Outer Space Treaty dictates actions in space. However,
this could not be further from the truth. The proper way to ex-
amine an issue related to military action is by first examining the
legal authority governing armed conflicts. The Law of Armed
Conflict will always be the base point for an examination of
whether a weapon or military action is permissible because it is
designed to minimize suffering and prevent unnecessary
destruction.32
The Outer Space Treaty is the law governing outer space, so it
will be the first source of international law to consult in an analy-
sis of permissible actions and objects in space. Where these ac-
tions and objects are military in nature, the next source of
international law necessary for such an analysis is the Law of
Armed Conflict. This is because it builds upon the Outer Space
Treaty articles. Before it is possible to detail how the Law of
Armed Conflict and the Outer Space Treaty work together, it is
necessary to examine key concepts of both.
A. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
From jus in bello, three essential principles have emerged33
that emphasize the conduct of “belligerents during warfare, thus
forming a crucial part of the” Law of Armed Conflict.34 These
three principles consist of military necessity, distinction, and
proportionality.35 First, military necessity involves the reasona-
bleness of the destruction of an enemy force.36 Essentially, there
32 Ramey, supra note 29, at 28 (quoting Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Ameri-
canum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First-Century War and its Possible Implications of the
Law of Armed Conflict, in 71 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, THE LAW OF ARMED CON-
FLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 412 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green,
eds., 1998), reprinted in 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1051 (1998)).
33 Jackson Maogoto & Steven Freeland, The Final Frontier: The Laws of Armed
Conflict and Space Warfare, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 165, 176 (2007).
34 See Ramey, supra note 29, at 35.
35 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 176.
36 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 176.
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must be a specified military advantage gained by conducting an
attack.37 Further, military necessity calls for an apparent “con-
nection between the attack and the suppression of the enemy’s
military capability.”38 Second, distinction requires an attacker to
distinguish civilians and civilian objects from military combat-
ants and objects and to use weaponry that is capable of making
this distinction.39 Simply, distinction requires “diligence in the
‘selection of methods, of weaponry, and of targets’” by a state
who wishes to commence hostilities.40
Finally, proportionality demands an assessment of any proba-
ble collateral damage which may occur as a result of an attack.41
In addition, even when an attack furthers a legitimate military
objective, the results of the attack “should not be disproportion-
ate to any expected military advantage.”42 In order to determine
what the results would be, it is necessary to examine the military
force used and any injury or damage it inflicted upon civilians
and civilian property.43 These principles of necessity, distinction,
and proportionality are reaffirmed in Protocol I.44
B. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION
Protocol I to the Geneva Convention is the most relevant doc-
trine within the Law of Armed Conflict in terms of its applica-
tion to space.45 This is largely due to its wide applicability and
limiting authority, which places restrictions on weaponry and
military action.46 Article 35 establishes the most fundamental
rule of armed conflict, which is the right for parties to a conflict
to select the means and methods of warfare.47 However, this is
not an unlimited authority: there are limitations on weapons,
methods, materials, and projectiles that may cause gratuitous in-
jury or unnecessary suffering.48
37 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 176.
38 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 177.
39 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 177.
40 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 177 (quoting DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 5 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 1989)).
41 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 178.
42 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 178.
43 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 178.
44 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 176–78.
45 See Onley, supra note 1, at 754.
46 See Onley, supra note 1, at 754.
47 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 35.
48 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 35.
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Articles 48 and 52 work together to reinforce the second prin-
ciple of jus in bello, distinction.49 Article 48 establishes protec-
tions for the civilian population by distinguishing civilian objects
from military objects and by limiting the operations of a State to
military objectives.50 Article 52 limits attacks to military objec-
tives and defines military objectives as “those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contri-
bution to military action.”51 Further, there is a requirement that
the “total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization,” offer
a clear-cut military advantage of some kind.52
Article 51 establishes protections for civilian populations
against military operations.53 This Article seeks to regulate indis-
criminate attacks on civilian populations.54 The final Article
from Protocol I which limits military action and weaponry in
space is Article 56. Article 56 states that strategic sites which con-
tain dangerous forces shall not be targeted for attack “if such
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and conse-
quent severe losses among” civilians.55 Ultimately, combatants
must take precautions to spare civilians before the commence-
ment of an attack. Section III addresses the precise applicability
of the Law of Armed Conflict to the non-human-centric environ-
ment of space.
C. LIMITATIONS FROM THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty states that parties to the
agreement shall not place into orbit, place on celestial bodies,
or station in space in any manner objects carrying a nuclear
weapon or other weapons of mass destruction.56 In addition, Ar-
ticle IV requires that the Moon and other celestial bodies be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes.57 Military bases, installa-
tions, fortifications, the testing of any weapon, and military exer-
cises are all forbidden on celestial bodies.58 However, military
personnel conducting research and the use of any equipment or
49 Protocol I, supra note 22, arts. 48, 52.
50 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 48.
51 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 52.
52 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 52.
53 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51.
54 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51.
55 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 56.
56 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 4.
57 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 4.
58 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 4.
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facilities necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon are per-
mitted.59 Article V details the treatment of astronauts in the
event of “accident, distress, or emergency landing,” and requires
the safe and prompt return of those astronauts to the State in
which their space vehicle is registered.60
Article VI is relevant because it makes States responsible for
the actions of non-governmental entities.61 In the event that any
non-governmental entity violates the treaty’s rules, it appears
that States are ultimately responsible, incentivizing States to
monitor the actions of such entities.62 Article IX’s importance to
weaponry and military actions derives from the requirement
that if a State’s activity, experiment, or nationals could cause po-
tentially harmful interference with another State’s peaceful ex-
ploration and use of space, then it must consult with that State
before proceeding.63 Likewise, if a State believes that another
State’s activity or experiment will result in potentially harmful
interference with its peaceful exploration and use of space, then
it may request a consultation with the other State.64
III. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
A. DOES THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT APPLY TO SPACE?
There may be a lingering question regarding why the Law of
Armed Conflict applies in space—specifically why the Law of
Armed Conflict applies when there is no appearance of a direct
threat of harm to human beings. If there is weaponry in space
intended for the benefit of a conflict, any action resulting from
the use of that weapon will be subject to the Law of Armed Con-
flict. The Geneva Conventions establish that States shall comply
and ensure compliance with the convention in all circum-
stances.65 In addition, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
determined in an advisory opinion that the Law of Armed Con-
flict applied to “all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons,
59 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 4.
60 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 5.
61 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6.
62 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 6.
63 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 9.
64 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. 9.
65 Dale Stephens, Why Outer Space Matters: Dr. Dale Stephens Gives a Brief Introduc-
tion to International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS BLOG (Nov.
7, 2016), http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/twmzia1cp84kv2c29bi4iz6q4u03in
[https://perma.cc/XRD8-JZYA].
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those of the past, those of the present and those of the future.”66
This appears to establish that the arena in which combat may
take place or the form it takes is irrelevant because the Law of
Armed Conflict is applicable to any war and any weapon uti-
lized. If this is the case, there is nothing limiting the application
of the Law of Armed Conflict to space.
It seems that when there is a significant threat to human life
by an attack, there is no question regarding the applicability of
the Law of Armed Conflict. Ambiguity remains, however, re-
garding whether the law applies to a situation in outer space
involving technology, namely satellites. This is a question that
has lingered, and some have chosen to respond with the state-
ment that “satellites don’t have mothers.”67 This statement is just
a reiteration of the idea that if there is not a direct threat to
human life by an attack in space, then there is no need to pro-
tect or defend satellites in accordance with the Law of Armed
Conflict.68
However, this is an inaccurate view of the Law of Armed Con-
flict. As previously noted, Articles 35, 48, 51, 52, and 56 of Proto-
col I are some of the most readily applicable provisions to space.
This is due to their wide applicability to future anti-satellite
weapons, which have the potential to precipitously cripple cru-
cial noncombatant infrastructure.69 Ultimately, this damage to
infrastructure could harm civilian populations and therefore
trigger the Law of Armed Conflict.
1. Methods and Means of Warfare
Article 35, which seeks to regulate superfluous injury or un-
necessary suffering, should apply to an anti-satellite attack on an
enemy’s satellite network that severely cripples the civilian popu-
lation.70 The results of such an attack would be the cessation of
civilian communications.71 In today’s society, rescue services,
navigation on the ground and for aviation, cell phones, and
66 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 86 (July 8).
67 John J. Klein, Space Warfare: Deterrence, Dissuasion and the Law of Armed Con-





70 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 35.
71 See Onley, supra note 1, at 754–55.
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many more services vital to infrastructure depend on satellite
networks. Accordingly, such a widespread attack on a satellite
network would affect the well-being of civilians.
Ultimately, this would adversely affect the civilian population
because the infrastructure of a State would be crippled, poten-
tially setting the State back decades during the restoration of its
communications.72 This would clearly be a case of unnecessary
suffering, which Article 35 urges States to avoid, due to the im-
mediate degradation of technological infrastructure.73 The civil-
ian population would be left without the technological
infrastructure necessary to support modern civilian populations.
The loss of infrastructure could result in the death of numerous
individuals, a result Article 35 is intended to prevent.74
2. Distinction
Articles 48 and 52 represent the distinction portion of the jus
in bello fundamental principles.75 Both articles require combat-
ants to distinguish between military objectives and civilian ob-
jects.76 When it comes to satellites, distinguishing between
civilian and military objectives can be difficult due to satellites’
ability to serve both civilian and military purposes, sometimes
simultaneously.77 If the military uses satellites that also benefit
civilians, those satellites may be viewed as valid military objec-
tives. The goal of Articles 48 and 52 seems to be instilling re-
sponsibility for differentiating between objectives onto the State
commencing the attack.78 Collateral damage is allowed but must
result from having lawfully targeted a military objective. This
makes it more difficult for States to comply since force can only
be lawfully directed at military objectives.79 If a distinction be-
tween civilian and military objectives cannot be made, the State
should avoid the attack completely.80
72 See Onley, supra note 1, at 755.
73 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 35.
74 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 35.
75 See Protocol I, supra note 22, arts. 48, 52.
76 Protocol I, supra note 22, arts. 48, 52.
77 Onley, supra note 1, at 757.
78 See Protocol I, supra note 22, arts. 48, 52.
79 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 48.
80 See Onley, supra note 1, at 757–58.
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3. Protection of Civilians
Article 51 builds upon the distinction principle by requiring
civilians to be protected from dangers that arise from military
operations.81 As mentioned previously, an attack on a State’s sat-
ellite network could result in the collapse of civilian communica-
tions and overall infrastructure, which could lead to the loss of
life. If an attack were to occur, the results would likely constitute
a violation of Article 51.82 Article 56 seeks to prevent attacks re-
sulting in the release of dangerous forces or severe civilian
losses.83 Article 56 could be invoked as a preventative measure to
the destruction of a satellite.84 This is due to the debris released
from such an attack, which could potentially damage other
nearby satellites. This would cause—or possibly exacerbate—
some of the issues already mentioned that would result from the
destruction of satellites. In addition, while it is likely that debris
would stay in orbit or burn up on re-entry, it is possible that
debris from an attack could reach Earth’s surface.85 Besides the
possibility that this debris could cause direct harm by landing in
a heavily populated area, harm could result from the fact that
some materials used in the construction of satellites—like hydra-
zine, which can produce effects similar to that of a neurotoxin—
are severely toxic and could cause adverse effects on the civilian
population.86
B. HOW THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE OUTER SPACE
TREATY WORK JOINTLY
It appears that the Law of Armed Conflict is, in fact, applica-
ble in outer space, both in situations where there is a direct
threat to civilian populations and in situations where the threat
is not so apparent. While the Outer Space Treaty does make
some progress in addressing potential military or weaponization
issues in space, there are some issues that it leaves open. For
example, the Outer Space Treaty only limits the use of weapons
81 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51.
82 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51.
83 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 56.
84 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 56.
85 Onley, supra note 1, at 760.
86 Onley, supra note 1, at 760.; see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Health Effects
Notebook for Hazardous Air Pollutants, Hydrazine CAS 302-01-2, https://www.epa
.gov/sites/production/files/2016-09/documents/hydrazine.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5KJC-AGWX].
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of mass destruction, not the use of all weapons.87 There is noth-
ing within the Outer Space Treaty which restricts a State from
stationing another type of weapon in space.88 Further, there is
great debate over the exact meaning of “peaceful purposes”
under the Outer Space Treaty.89 Some interpret it to mean
“non-military” while others interpret it to mean “non-aggressive”
or “non-hostile.”90
The problem with the Outer Space Treaty is that there are
various loopholes that any State may utilize. While some restric-
tions the Outer Space Treaty places on States are finite, others
change depending on whether the State’s action occurs on a
celestial body or in space. However, the Law of Armed Conflict
can help fill some of the void left by the Outer Space Treaty.
The Law of Armed Conflict is largely considered to be cus-
tomary international law, like the articles set forth in the Outer
Space Treaty.91 Customary international law is an obligation that
arises from States’ practices.92 Essentially, when enough States
engage in a practice, it becomes the standard upon which all
States are held.93 This means that even if States are not parties to
the Outer Space Treaty or agreements that derive from the Law
of Armed Conflict, they are still bound to follow these interna-
tional laws.94 Even if a State withdraws and decides to enact a law
counter to the Outer Space Treaty or the Law of Armed Con-
flict, it would still be bound to these agreements due to their
status as customary international law.95
Article III of the Outer Space Treaty states that parties to the
treaty shall operate their activities in the exploration and use of
space in accordance with applicable international law.96 The
87 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
88 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, arts. I–XVII.
89 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV; Onley, supra note 1, at 751
(quoting John W. Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F. L.
REV. 107, 128 (2010)).
90 Onley, supra note 1, at 751.
91 Onley, supra note 1, at 751 (citing David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary
International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1187, 1233–35 (2009)).
92 For a more thorough discussion, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 181 (June 27);
see also North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Repub. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969
I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 28).
93 Koplow, supra note 91, at 1223.
94 Koplow, supra note 91, at 1229.
95 See Koplow, supra note 91, at 1229.
96 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. III.
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purpose behind this guideline derives from two ideas: (1) to en-
sure the maintenance of international peace and security; and
(2) to promote international operations and understanding.97
This indicates that the Outer Space Treaty is not meant to be
interpreted on its own. Instead, it is necessary to examine issues
that manifest under the Outer Space Treaty in combination with
any other applicable international law. Therefore, the Outer
Space Treaty must be used in combination with the Law of
Armed Conflict to accurately examine any issues involving mili-
tarization or weaponry in space.
IV. MILITARY ACTION AND THE WEAPONIZATION
OF SPACE
The most beneficial way to examine issues that originate from
the utilization of space is by first examining whether the Outer
Space Treaty explicitly prohibits the action, method, or weapon
in question. If it is not prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty,
then it is necessary to examine any prohibition which may de-
velop due to the Law of Armed Conflict. Since the Law of
Armed Conflict is so far-reaching, if an action, method, or
weapon clears any hurdles raised by the Law of Armed Conflict,
it is likely that that action, method, or weapon is not prohibited.
A. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SPACE
1. Military Bases and Military Installations
The Outer Space Treaty expressly forbids constructing mili-
tary bases, installations, and fortifications on celestial bodies.98
However, the use of “any . . . facility necessary for the peaceful
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies” is permit-
ted.99 This clearly leaves room for military installations to be
placed in space. Theoretically, if a state were to construct mili-
tary bases, installations, or fortifications in outer space, that ac-
tion would appear valid under the Outer Space Treaty. There is
no apparent harm from the construction, so it is unlikely that
the Law of Armed Conflict would be triggered, and it would ap-
pear that such an installation is permissible.
However, while the Outer Space Treaty allows for the con-
struction of any facilities used for peaceful explorations of the
97 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. III.
98 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
99 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
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Moon and other celestial bodies, what these facilities may con-
sist of is not defined.100 Thus, if a military base conformed with
the peaceful purpose of the Outer Space Treaty and was neces-
sary for peaceful exploration, it would appear to be permissible.
If the drafters wanted to use the term “military base” in place of
“facility” they could have repeated the “military bases, installa-
tions and fortifications” language used earlier in the treaty.101
Instead, the term “facility” is used here, and a distinction is
made for military personnel engaging in scientific research.
Therefore, the facility mentioned in Article IV must mean a fa-
cility that is not a military base, installation, or fortification.
Further justification for this interpretation is apparent when
examining Article IV. Military personnel performing scientific
research is explicitly mentioned.102 These individuals are not
prohibited from operating in outer space.103 This seems to indi-
cate that there is something different about military bases, in-
stallations, and fortifications. Under the Outer Space Treaty, it
appears that in all circumstances these facilities are forbidden
from celestial bodies.104 However, floating a military base or in-
stallation in outer space seems permissible under the Outer
Space Treaty.
2. Reconnaissance
There is no language within the Outer Space Treaty that ex-
pressly forbids reconnaissance. Similarly, as with military bases
and installations in space, reconnaissance activities cause no ap-
parent harm, so it is unlikely that the Law of Armed Conflict
would be triggered.105 Article I of the Outer Space Treaty explic-
itly states that “[o]uter space, including the moon and celestial
bodies shall be free for exploration and use by all States.”106 Fur-
ther, the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of “peaceful pur-
poses” leaves room for interpretation.
As mentioned earlier, some scholars interpret “peaceful pur-
poses” to mean “non-military” while others interpret it to mean
“non-aggressive” or “non-hostile.”107 There has largely not been
100 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
101 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
102 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
103 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
104 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
105 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
106 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. I.
107 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
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protest for overflights of satellites performing reconnaissance.108
There are restrictions when reconnaissance requires crossing
into a State’s sovereign airspace, but reconnaissance from space
seems permissible.109 Space-based reconnaissance conforms with
the requirements set forth in the Outer Space Treaty, and there
is no apparent restriction.110
B. ANTI-SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY
A significant portion of attacks using anti-satellite technology
involve some form of interference. The International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) coordinates frequency assignments
and regulates orbital slots for satellites.111 The benefits of be-
coming a member of the ITU include international recognition
of space-based frequency assignments and the ability to protect
satellite networks from harmful interference.112 The ITU Consti-
tution, which member states agree to act in accordance with,
explicitly addresses harmful interference in Article 45.113 Article
45 requires the avoidance of harmful interference by member
States and requests that States take practicable steps to ensure
that harmful interference does not occur on their behalf.114
Similar principles are also codified in the ITU Convention and
the ITU Radio Regulations.115
The Radiocommunication Bureau (the Bureau) and Radio
Regulations Board (the Board) interpret, administer, and en-
108 Joseph R. Soraghan, Reconnaissance Satellites: Legal Characterization and Possi-
ble Utilization for Peacekeeping, 13 MCGILL L.J. 458, 458 (1967).
109 See id. at 459–60.
110 See David L. Willson, An Army View of Neutrality in Space: Legal Options for
Space Negation, 50 A.F. L. REV. 175, 177 n.2 (2001) (defining interference).
111 Jannat C. Thompson, Space for Rent: The International Telecommunications
Union, Space Law, and Orbit/Spectrum Leasing, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 279, 289–90
(1996).
112 Julie N. Zoller, Satellite Regulations, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www
.itu.int/net/newsroom/wrc/2012/features/satellite_regulations.aspx [https://
perma.cc/KX9A-3KSG].
113 Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (Geneva,
1992), art. 45, 1996 B.T.S. 24 [hereinafter ITU Constitution].
114 Id.
115 See Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Collection
of the Basic Texts Adopted by the Plenipotentiary Conference, at 95, 103–04
(2015) [hereinafter ITU Convention]; see also Radio Regulations of the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union, art. 15 (2016) [hereinafter ITU Radio
Regulations].
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force the policies and agreements of the ITU.116 The Bureau
applies the provisions of the Radio Regulations and Rules of
Procedure.117 It also investigates and assists in resolving cases of
harmful interference.118 The Board addresses matters that the
Bureau cannot resolve by applying the Radio Regulations and
provides recommendations on reports of unresolved interfer-
ence investigations carried out by the Bureau.119 However, there
are several issues with the ITU that prevent it from being as
helpful as the Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Con-
flict. One detrimental difference when compared to the Outer
Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict is that the ITU is
not considered to be customary international law. States have
broken the ITU Convention, Constitution, and Radio Regula-
tions on several occasions.120 If States are acting counter to the
rules set in place, it becomes difficult to say that there is any
chance that those rules will achieve customary international law
status. States join the ITU because it is in their best interest, but
the observance of the rules is based more on an honor system
because the ITU has no enforcement power.121 The ITU cannot
exercise any real control over member States, which ultimately
makes its use less practical than the Outer Space Treaty or the
Law of Armed Conflict. For these reasons, the following analysis
will not take the ITU into consideration.
116 The Radiocommunication Bureau and the Radio Regulations Board were
formerly a joint division of the ITU called the International Frequency Registra-
tion Bureau (IFRB). See Thompson, supra note 111, at 289 n.76.





120 See Peter B. de Selding, Eutelsat Blames Ethiopia as Jamming Incidents Triple,
SPACE NEWS (June 6, 2014), http://spacenews.com/40818eutelsat-blames-ethio-
pia-as-jamming-incidents-triple/ [https://perma.cc/237X-AWEU]; see also Ste-
phanie Nebehay, U.N. Tells Iran to End Eutelsat Satellite Jamming, REUTERS (Mar. 26,
2010, 7:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-jamming-itu/u-n-tells-
iran-to-end-eutelsat-satellite-jamming-idUSTRE62P21G20100326 [https://perma
.cc/G6DD-CZW4].
121 Thompson, supra note 111, at 290.
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1. Jamming
Jamming is the overloading of enemy receivers with strong
signals sent via another satellite or an uplink station.122 Jamming
targets typically consist of positioning systems, navigation sys-
tems, and satellite communications.123 It is possible to defeat
jamming attempts via encryption.124 For example, military com-
munication is likely to be heavily encrypted and therefore un-
likely to be subject to successful jamming attempts.125 Thus,
jamming has a greater potential to impact civilians.
If a jamming attack comes from another satellite, it is neces-
sary to examine the Outer Space Treaty to determine whether
there is some trigger for its application. The Outer Space Treaty
forbids weapons of mass destruction.126 Jamming is not forbid-
den by this portion of Article IV because it is not a weapon of
mass destruction. The Moon and celestial bodies have to be
used exclusively for peaceful purposes, but satellites are sta-
tioned in space and therefore do not trigger this section of the
article. To this point, it appears that Article IV does not apply to
satellite-on-satellite jamming.
However, Article IX may be applicable because it requires
States to undertake appropriate consultations with another State
if they believe an activity or experiment planned in outer space
could cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
another State in its peaceful exploration and use of outer
space.127 This article appears to require a State engaging in jam-
ming to first consult the State subject to jamming.128 The issue
with resolving a jamming issue—or any space issue—under Arti-
cle IX, is that the article appears only to apply during peaceful
exploration.129 Traditionally it has been up to States to deter-
mine when consultation is necessary, and because jamming is
not peaceful, it is unlikely a State would engage in such a consul-
122 See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS,
COUNTERMEASURES, AND ARMS CONTROL 4 (1985), https://www.princeton.edu/
~ota/disk2/1985/8502/8502.pdf [https://perma.cc/UH5P-4Z6H].




126 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
127 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX.
128 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX.
129 See generally Jordi Sandalinas, Art IX of the Outer Space Treaty and Peaceful Pur-
poses: Issues and Implementation (Dec. 2, 2010) (unpublished report), http://www
.iislweb.org/docs/2010_Galloway_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T47L-7XNH].
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tation.130 The Outer Space Treaty appears to be silent on jam-
ming at this point. However, jamming is an attack that may
result in harm, so an examination under the Law of Armed Con-
flict is necessary.
The results of jamming may reach a magnitude necessary to
trigger the Law of Armed Conflict. As previously mentioned,
Protocol I seeks to prevent unnecessary suffering on the part of
the civilian population and requires States to distinguish be-
tween civilian and military purposes.131 As noted, the military’s
superior encryption capabilities suggest that civilians are more
likely to be affected by average jamming attempts.132 While most
jamming attempts are temporary, there could be significant ef-
fects on civilian infrastructure if they are overextended. Further,
the same satellites can alternate between civilian and military
use, complicating the requirement that States distinguish be-
tween the two.133
Long-term interruption of satellite communication, naviga-
tion, and other networks via jamming could be harmful to the
civilian population, especially if a State could not distinguish be-
tween a military and civilian objective. If this distinction cannot
be made, the jamming should not occur because a State com-
mencing an attack has the responsibility to distinguish military
objects.134 However, jamming can be—and likely would be—cir-
cumvented before inflicting significant harm on the civilian
population. If there is no significant harm to the population (col-
lateral damage is allowed) it is likely that the Law of Armed Con-
flict would not be triggered.135 If jamming occurs via an
earthbound uplink station, the Outer Space Treaty would likely
not apply. However, as with jamming via another satellite, the
Law of Armed Conflict would be triggered if there is significant
harm to the civilian population.136 The same principles that ap-
plied for jamming via satellites would likely apply to jamming
occurring via an uplink of some kind. Likewise, if no significant
harm to civilians occurs, then the Law of Armed Conflict would
likely not apply.137
130 Id.
131 See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.
135 See Boothby, supra note 123, at 212.
136 See Boothby, supra note 123, at 212.
137 See Boothby, supra note 123, at 212.
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2. Dazzling
Dazzling typically involves “using a low-powered, ground-
based laser to spread just enough radiation over the satellite’s
electro-optical sensors to blind it.”138 This can be temporary or
permanent, depending on the intensity of the laser used.139 The
more high-powered the laser, the more likely the laser will dis-
able, damage, or destroy the satellite.140 As previously stated, the
Outer Space Treaty does not prohibit all weapons from being
used in space: it only prohibits those with the potential for mass
destruction.141 Additionally, the lasers used in dazzling opera-
tions have been Earth-based, so the Outer Space Treaty would
likely not be triggered.142 For this reason, it would be logical to
examine dazzling under the scope of Protocol I.
An analysis of dazzling faces some of the same obstacles as
jamming because the Law of Armed Conflict requires some sig-
nificant danger to civilian life or well-being.143 It is unlikely that
low-powered lasers would automatically trigger Protocol I unless
temporary blinding occurred to such a degree that vital civilian
services were put at risk. Article 56 seeks to avoid a severe civil-
ian loss, but there is a question of whether temporary blinding
would cause such a degree of harm.144 Unless the temporary
blindness was to such a degree that the loss of civilian life was
significantly foreseeable, the Law of Armed Conflict likely would
not be triggered.
However, high-powered lasers present a different case.145 A
high-powered laser can result in the disabling, damaging, or de-
struction of a satellite.146 On its surface, this would appear more
likely to trigger Protocol I for a few reasons.147 If a satellite is
fully disabled, then a State loses full functionality of a significant
device that could cripple the State in some circumstances. It
138 Jameson W. Crockett, Space Warfare in the Here and Now: The Rules of Engage-
ment for U.S. Weaponized Satellites in the Current Legal Space Regime, 77 J. AIR L. &
COM. 671, 675 (2012).




141 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7.
142 See Crockett, supra note 138, at 675.
143 See supra notes 123–34 and accompanying text.
144 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 56.
145 See A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, supra note 139.
146 See A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, supra note 139.
147 See Protocol I, supra note 22.
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could also mean that a valuable piece of civilian infrastructure
may be unavailable for the immediate future until a workaround
or a replacement could be put into space. Depending on the
satellite’s value to civilian infrastructure in terms of civilian well-
being, such disabling may trigger a violation of Protocol I.148
Perhaps the most significant hazard is that a dead satellite
would be adrift in space without the ability to adjust, putting
other satellites in danger.149 In 2009, two satellites collided with
each other over Siberia.150 The collision resulted in over 1,000
individual pieces of debris traveling at over 26,000 miles per
hour.151 If this were the result of a high-powered laser, Articles
48 and 52 of Protocol I might have applied since they require a
distinction to be made between military objectives and civilian
objects.152 A dead satellite, plus any debris from a collision,
would lack control and could ultimately cause a larger degree of
harm based on the high-powered laser attack. It would be im-
portant to hold States accountable under this scenario because
eventually, the amount of debris could become so great that it
would be impossible to safely navigate space.
The Kessler Syndrome is the idea that the accumulation of
debris in space, especially from collisions, could ultimately cause
a chain reaction resulting in an orbit no longer being usable.153
For this reason, such an attack may also trigger Article 51, which
seeks to protect civilians from the dangers that arise from mili-
tary operations.154 If such a cascading effect did take place, the
destruction would not distinguish military from civilian, much
less different States. These are the foreseeable results of a State
taking steps to disable, damage, or destroy a satellite via daz-
zling. Unfortunately, if a satellite is disabled, it not only presents
a danger to one State’s infrastructure, but possibly to many
other States’ infrastructures. For this reason, dazzling via a high-
powered laser would likely trigger the Law of Armed Conflict,
and the State responsible for the attack would be held liable.
148 See Protocol I, supra note 22.
149 Kyle Hill, Some Dead Satellites Refuse to Go Quietly to Their Graves, NAUTILUS




152 See Protocol I, supra note 22, arts. 48, 52.
153 Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris (MMOD), NASA (2014), https://www.nasa
.gov/centers/wstf/site_tour/remote_hypervelocity_test_laboratory/micrometeo-
roid_and_orbital_debris.html [https://perma.cc/GE9E-PG4L].
154 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51.
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3. Kinetic Weapons
Kinetic weapons are characterized by the explosion they cause
near their target.155 Kinetic anti-satellite weaponry steers close to
its target via rockets to coincide with the target’s orbital path
and detonates once it is in the target’s vicinity.156 The Outer
Space Treaty does not forbid weapons in outer space, and Arti-
cle IV’s limitation of peacefulness is confined to the Moon and
other celestial bodies.157 Kinetic anti-satellite weapons do main-
tain an orbit, but States are only forbidden from placing objects
carrying nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in
orbit around the Earth.158 Under only the Outer Space Treaty, it
is difficult to say such use of a kinetic weapon is not permissible.
It does not appear that there is any provision in the Outer Space
Treaty that prevents the use of a kinetic anti-satellite weapon.
Article 35 of Protocol I prohibits methods of warfare that can
result in widespread long-term damage.159 This is relevant to ki-
netic weapons primarily due to the lasting effect such a weapon
could have in space: not only would there be the projectiles or
debris from the kinetic weapon, but there would also be wide-
spread debris from the destruction of the satellite.160 Similar to
the issues discussed in the dazzling section, it is unclear whether
such a weapon could properly distinguish between military and
civilian objects, as required by Article 48 of Protocol 1.161
Kinetic weapons accomplish their missions by destroying satel-
lites via explosions or direct impact.162 Despite the method cho-
sen, debris—which can travel in any direction—is the likely
result.163 As the debris travels, it risks colliding with even more
satellites, further damaging civilian infrastructure around the
world, which may be dependent on satellites. It appears that the
Law of Armed Conflict is designed to protect against these situa-
tions.164 Protocol I is largely concerned with the actions of States
in a conflict and how their actions could affect civilians and civil-
ian objects, but it also seeks to limit indiscriminate destruc-
155 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 187.
156 Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 188.
157 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
158 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
159 Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 35.
160 See Maogoto & Freeland, supra note 33, at 188.
161 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 48.
162 Boothby, supra note 123, at 208.
163 See Boothby, supra note 123, at 208.
164 See Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51.
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tion.165 A kinetic weapon would likely violate several goals of the
Law of Armed Conflict. For this reason, the use of a kinetic
weapon would likely violate the Law of Armed Conflict.
C. NATIONAL DEFENSES IN SPACE
Under the Outer Space Treaty, there are no inherent restric-
tions on States utilizing self-defense in outer space. The Treaty
asks States to act with a peaceful purpose on the Moon and
other celestial bodies, but this reiterates the great debate regard-
ing what “peaceful” means.166 When it comes to national de-
fense, the Outer Space Treaty is silent. As to the Law of Armed
Conflict, to this point, this note has largely discussed principles
derived from jus in bello, which governs actual hostilities.167 Jus
ad bellum is the other principle of the Law of Armed Conflict,
and it details whether the conflict itself is lawful or unlawful.168
States maintain an inherent right to use armed force in self-
defense, and this right is embraced as lawful under jus ad bel-
lum.169 The right to self-defense is not unlimited because the
principles of jus in bello still apply, but there is nothing inher-
ently wrong with a State defending itself. If an attack were immi-
nent and a State utilizing a defense system could justify the use
of force while conforming with the Geneva Convention and the
Additional Protocols, the use of force would be valid under the
Law of Armed Conflict. However, any defenses could not use a
nuclear weapon or any other weapon of mass destruction, as this
is forbidden by the Outer Space Treaty.170 If a defensive system
targets a satellite, the State utilizing self-defense still risks trig-
gering a violation of Protocol I for the same reasons discussed in
the anti-satellite section. If a State complies with both the Outer
Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict, there is no restric-
tion on a valid use of self-defense, if the methods and means of
carrying out that self-defense conforms with both.
165 See Boothby, supra note 123, at 181–87.
166 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV.
167 See Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Revoking an Aggressor’s License to Kill Military Forces
Serving the United Nations: Making Deterrence Personal, 22 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1,
10 (1998).
168 Id. at 8.
169 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
170 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7.
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V. CONCLUSION
When there is a question of validity regarding the militariza-
tion or weaponization of outer space, and the Outer Space
Treaty does not explicitly answer it, it is necessary to examine
the Law of Armed Conflict. While the entirety of the Law of
Armed Conflict applies to conflicts in space, Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions comprises a significant portion of
the analysis. This is due to the fact that Protocol I applies to
international conflicts, reaffirms the four Geneva Conventions,
and contributes additional protections to civilians and soldiers.
These two areas of international law are largely considered to be
customary international law, which is why they work best when
jointly examined.
In the analysis of military personnel, anti-satellite weapons,
and national defense apparatus in space, it is apparent that
there are areas and scenarios in which the Outer Space Treaty
does not apply, but the Law of Armed Conflict can fill such
voids. As was briefly discussed, the ITU’s inability to enforce its
governing documents is a major concern. With the Outer Space
Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict, enforcement is not a
concern because it can come from the International Court of
Justice, the International Criminal Court, and ad hoc tribunals.
Furthermore, the United Nations would be more likely to take
action through sanctions or even the Security Council, depend-
ing on the State committing the violation.
While there are other doctrines and treaties, they may not
have the same enforcement power as the joint-analytical ap-
proach utilizing both the Outer Space Treaty and the Law of
Armed Conflict. This is because the Outer Space Treaty lays out
the minimum standards for a State’s activities in space, but also
leaves areas in which a State could theoretically abuse ambiguity
or loopholes. The Law of Armed Conflict is so expansive that it
can provide clarity to the ambiguous areas left open by the
Outer Space Treaty. Since both are considered customary inter-
national law, States cannot withdraw or pass legislation that
would allow them to act counter to the principles presented in
both the Outer Space Treaty and the Law of Armed Conflict.
